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Introduction
By analyzing our broad survey of Japanese adults from 2005 to 2008, the purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the effects of time discounting and its behavioral biases on smoking behavior, and their responses to a hike in cigarette taxes. We incorporate two time discounting biases that has been reported in dynamic choice theory: (i) hyperbolic discounting, under which a person discounts the immediate future more intensively than the distant future, and thereby makes time-inconsistent decisions;
and (ii) the sign effect, by which a person discounts positive future payoffs more intensively than negative future payoffs (for the empirical validity of the biases and their implications, see, e.g., Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989; Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991; Ainslie, 1992; Khwaja et al., 2007) . We hypothesize that hyperbolic discounters smoke more than exponential discounters; that reductions in cigarette consumption after a tax hike amongst naïve hyperbolic smokers are larger than those amongst the others;
and that decreases in cigarette consumption after a tax hike amongst hyperbolic smokers are larger than those amongst exponential smokers.
The novelty of the present research is in the following two points. First, we identify respondents' types by whether discounting is exponential or hyperbolic and by whether decision making is sophisticated or naïve. We estimate differences in smoking behavior among the distinct types of respondents. Second, by using the actual time series data of the cigarette tax, which is exogenously determined by the Japan's government, we quantify how the natural experiment of cigarette tax hikes in 2006 affects smoking behavior of each type of respondents. To do so, we use our four-year panel survey data, in which roughly three to five thousands of Japanese adults each year reply to questionnaires on preferences and various attributes.
The main results of this article are as follows: Firstly, discount rates and time discounting biases relate to cigarette consumption. Discount rates, the procrastinating tendency, and naiveness have significantly positive associations with cigarette consumption and the sign effect has significantly negative correlations to smoking behavior. Secondly, tax hikes decrease ex-post smoking. In particular, hyperbolic, procrastinating, or naïve respondents decrease their after-tax-hike cigarette consumption more than others, implying that they postpone smoking moderation in response to future tax hikes and thereby adjust cigarette consumption mainly after the tax hike. Thirdly, other factors, e.g., gender, degree of risk aversion, education, household income, age, and existence of children significantly relate to smoking behavior.
Finally, the government's revenue from cigarette tax peaks at a JPY 29.92 (around USD 0.28 using the conversion rate [107.16] in February 2008) higher tax per cigarette than the present actual level.
In the present research, we follow Ikeda et al. (2010) in constructing data for discount rates, hyperbolic discounting or procrastination, and the sign effect from response data to questions on various hypothetical intertemporal decisions including choices between a small amount of present money and a larger amount of future money. In addition, naïve and sophisticated respondents are identified by using response data to two questions regarding procrastination in doing homework assignments: one regarding when they used to plan to do homework in summer vacations in their school days; and the other regarding when they in effect used to do homework. Respondents are classified as naïve if they used to procrastinate doing homework more than they planned whereas they are classified as sophisticated otherwise.
There are many empirical studies which investigate smoking behavior from the viewpoint of intertemporal decision makings (e.g., Mitchell, 1999; Bickel et al., 1999; Odum et al., 2002; Baker et al., 2003; Sato and Ohkusa, 2003; Reynolds et al., 2004; Ohmura et al., 2005; Khwaja et al., 2007; Ida and Goto, 2009 ) and by using rational addiction models (e.g., Chaloupka, 1990 Chaloupka, , 1991 Keeler et al., 1993; Becker et al., 1994; Bardsley and Olekalns, 1998; Luo et al., 2003; Wan, 2006) . Despite many attempts, however, the existing literature has not incorporated the effects of time discounting biases that behavioral economics has been reporting as important determinants of seemingly irrational behaviors such as time-inconsistent impulsive consumption of drugs and cigarettes (see, e.g., Ainslie, 1992) .
Our research is closely related in spirit to Gruber and Koszegi (2001) , which quantified by calibrations the welfare-enhancing effects of cigarette taxation under hyperbolic discounting. Although they emphasized the critical role that time-inconsistent preferences played in smoking-decision making, for their result to be empirically valid, it should be empirically examined how hyperbolic discounting affects smoking behavior, including responses to tax hikes, and how cigarette consumption differs between naïve and sophisticated smokers.
1 1 In pararel with our research, Ida (2009) 
examines correlations between implusiveness (hyperbolic
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2, our hypotheses of relations between time preferences and smoking are discussed. Section 3 presents a description of the data. Section 4 reports the estimation results about the determinants of smoking. Section 5 shows the differences of responses to tax hikes among types of time discounting and presents the policy implications of tax hikes. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
Time discounting and smoking

Discount rates
As shown by the theory of rational addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988) , persons with high discount rates can raise present utility by consuming addictive goods even if it induces future disutility by accumulating addiction, and thus they would smoke more than others. Indeed, significantly positive correlations between the amount of smoking and discount rates has been reported in literature (e.g., Bickel et al., 1999; Mitchell, 1999; Odum et al., 2002; Baker et al., 2003; Sato and Ohkusa, 2003; Reynolds et al., 2004; Ohmura et al., 2005; Ida and Goto, 2009) . Therefore, it can be hypothesized that persons with higher discount rates tend to smoke more than others.
Hyperbolic discounting
Hyperbolic discounting, under which a person discounts the immediate future more intensively than the distant future, induces the present bias, and thereby likely lead consumers to smoke excessively by underweighting the resulting future disutility. Sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, who are well aware of their procrastinating tendency due to hyperbolic discounting, smoke time-consistently by choosing discounting) and smoking by eliciting discount rates and risk preferences simultaneously from cross-section data.
He does not distinguish sophisticated and naïve respondents, incorporate sign effects, nor analyze the effect of tax hikes.
sequences of such high cigarette consumption levels that future selves would also choose under the same present bias. On the other hand, naïve hyperbolic discounters, who are unaware of their hyperbolic discounting, do not take into account their time-inconsistency problem in the smoking decision and therefore, smoke more than the sophisticated.
From the same logic, when the cigarette tax rises, hyperbolic discounters are likely to reduce cigarette consumption later than exponential discounters. Insofar as hyperbolic discounters are forward-looking optimizers, they start decreasing cigarette consumption when the preannouncement of a future tax hike takes place. Sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, however, choose such a small decrease in earlier period that future selves can consistently support. It is only after the tax and hence the cigarette price actually rises when they decrease cigarette consumption largely. In sum, sophisticated hyperbolic discounters procrastinate to moderate cigarette consumption until the tax hike is actually introduced. Naïve hyperbolic discounters procrastinate time-inconsistently the moderation of the consumption with a high discount rate for immediate future disutility. Thus, we hypothesize that hyperbolic discounters tend to smoke more than exponential discounters, and that even when a tax hike is pre-announced, they are likely to moderate cigarette consumption substantially after the tax hike is actually implemented. 
The sign effect
The sign effect, by which a person discounts positive payoffs more intensively than negative payoffs, leads to moderation in current addictive consumption because future disutility through the harmful effects of addiction is overvalued (e.g., Baker et al., 2003) . Therefore, we hypothesize that person with the sign effect smoke less than others. The number of samples and frequencies of responses 3.1. Tax hikes and cigarette consumption
The data
Cigarette consumption
The JHPS asks respondents about their smoking habits saying, "How many cigarettes do you smoke regularly? Select a proximal option from the following; (i) Never smoke at all; (ii) Hardly smoke; (iii) Smoke sometimes; (iv) About 10 cigarettes a day; (v) About a pack a day; (vi) More than 2 packs a day."
In 2007 and 2008, option "(vii) I used to smoke but have quit" is added.
To quantify cigarette consumption, we categorize respondents who select option (i), (ii) or (vii) as nonsmokers, (iii) as smokers consuming 0 to 5 cigarettes a day, (iv) 5 to 15, (v) 15 to 40, and (vi) as more than 40. By using the category data, we apply the method developed by Kimball et al. (2005) to estimate a log normal distribution for the distribution of the respondents' cigarette consumption of each year, from which each respondent's cigarette consumption is estimated as an expected value conditional on his or her categorical level of smoking.
Insert Table 2 Transition graphs of smoking behavior
The summary statistics of cigarette consumption and smoking rates are shown in Table 2 and the transition graphs are described in Figure 1 , where SMOKING represents the cigarette consumption estimated above. Male smokers smoke more than a pack per day and the amounts of smoking and smoking rates decreased during the entire investigation. On the other hand, the reported smoking amounts for to 39.3%. As for females, smoking amounts increased from 14.6 to 15.6 per day and their rates of regular smoking decreased from 12.0% to 11.3%.
Tax hikes
We can examine the effect of the tax hike on smoking behavior because a change of taxation policy on cigarettes arose during our sample period. The Japanese Government raised the cigarette tax from JPY Cabinet meeting on January 17th adopted the outline of revisions in the taxation system, and before the Diet on March 27th that passed the bill.
Our data are not frequent enough to detect the preannouncement effect of tax hikes unlike in Becker et al. (1994) which use monthly data. Therefore we limit our attention to smoking moderation after the tax hikes. 4 To examine post-tax hike behavior, we define a tax variable, named TAX, which represents the tax levels in each year.
Eliciting discount rates and its behavioral biases
In the JHPS, the respondents' discount rates were measured by asking five questions about intertemporal choice under alternative conditions. As in the previous survey research (e.g., Harrison et al., 2002; and Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006) , the respondents were told to choose a preferable option from two options "A" and "B," e.g., "A" receiving JPY 10,000 (around USD 93.32) in two days; and "B" receiving JPY 10,000 plus a certain amount of JPY α, say JPY 10,038 (around USD 93.67), in nine days, where choosing the delayed receipt "B" instead of "A" implies receiving 20% of the annual interest rate. In each question, eight such problems were posed in the form of a payoff table, with alternative α values, from small to large, and hence with alternative imputed interest rates, from low to high. Table 3 shows QUESTION 1, where the amount of receipt for option "A" is specified as JPY 10,000 and the imputed interest rate for option "B" changes from -10% to 300%. Respondents are expected to choose option "A" at low interest rates whereas, as the imputed interest rate goes up, to switch to "B" at some critical high rate. The individual respondents' discount rates can be inferred by estimating the interest rate at which the delayed receipt of "B" is indifferent to the more immediate receipt of "A". The elicited discount rates are associated with the particular choice conditions, e.g., two days vs. nine days, JPY 10,000
for option "A" in QUESTION 1.
Insert Table 3 :
Question to elicit discount rates: An example (QUESTION 1 for DR )
To test for time discounting biases, five questions were designed by controlling for: (i) money amounts for option "A" as JPY 10,000 or JPY 1 million (around USD 9331.84); (ii) time horizons for "A" as two days, one month, or ninety days; (iii) time delays as seven days or 12 months; and (iv) receipt or payment.
In "payment" question 5, the respondents were asked to choose: "A" paying JPY 1 million in one month;
or "B" paying JPY 1 million plus some amount in 13 months, from which acceptable interest rate payments to delay a JPY 1 million payment for 12 months were measured.
From each question, we obtaine raw response data in the form of category numbers, which tell us between which interest rates each respondent's choice switched from option "A" to "B" if any switch takes place. Some subjects did not switch their choices from "A" for all offered interest rates. By using the raw category data, we apply the method developed by Kimball et al. (2005) to estimate a log normal distribution for the cross-respondent distribution of gross discount rates, from which each respondent's gross discount rate for a certain question, i.e., a certain payoff table, is estimated as an expected value conditional on his or her switch taking place at a certain observed category. Descriptive statistics of elicited discount rates, together with the choice conditions under which they were elicited, are summarized in Table   4 , where
) represents the discount rate estimated from question i. 4 ). It is hypothesized that, with other things being equal, the respondents' cigarette consumption depends positively on the impatience index DISCRATE. Table 5 shows the simple correlation of time discounting variables with SMOKING.. Consistent with our hypothesis mentioned above, column 1 shows a significantly positive correlation betwwwn DISCRATE and cigarette consumption. Correlation coefficients of time discounting variables with SMOKING Table 6 summarizes the definitions, summary statistics of variables and hypothesized signs of variables that are used in the analysis below. Table 6: Definitions, summary statistics, and hypothesized signs of variables
Insert
Time discounting biases
By comparing the mean values of the elicited discount rates, we examine whether our average respondent displays the aforementioned two biases of time discounting. First, in any years, hyperbolic discounting or the immediacy effect is not observed on average since the mean of discount rate DR , imputed from the 5 More detailed correlation coefficients by gender in each year are summarized in Appendix B.
6 Although the standardized average DISCRATE of the elicited discount rates should theoretically satisfy E (DISCRATE) = 0 and σ (DISCRATE) = 1, neither equality is actually met as seen in the table. This comes from the fact that the numbers of effective responses differ among the five discount rate questions. 7 More detailed statistics by gender in each year are summarized in appendix A and C. immediate future choice (i.e., 2 days or 9 days), is not significantly higher than DR , applied to more distant future choice (i.e., 90 days or 97 days). Secondly, in all years, the discount rate DR applied for future receipts is significantly higher than DR , the one used to discount future payments, which implies that our average respondent displays the sign effect .
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To examine the effects of the time discounting biases on the respondents' cigarette consumption, we construct a binary indicator HYPERBOL for hyperbolic discounting and SIGN for the sign effect, where, e.g., HYPERBOL=1 if DR >DR and HYPERBOL=0 otherwise. From the mean values of HYPERBOL and SIGN, shown in Table 5 , the proportions of the respondents who display the anomalies are 67.3% for hyperbolic discounting and 90.3% for the sign effect. Our hypothesis is that, with other things being equal, the respondents' cigarette consumption is positively related to HYPERBOL and negatively to SIGN.
In Table 5 , the correlation coefficient of SIGN with cigarette consumption is significantly positive as expected above. The coefficient of HYPERBOL is, however, negative, which is inconsistent with our hypothesis. In section 4, we will discuss whether these results are robust after controlling other factors.
A proxy for procrastination and naïve hyperbolic discounting
To capture the immediacy effect, we also construct a proxy variable PROCR for hyperbolic discounting and NAÏVE for naïve agent. To measure respondents' degrees of hyperbolic discounting or procrastination, the JHPS survey asked them to indicate on a 5-point scale from 1 to 5 how they had been likely to procrastinate doing homework assignments for the vacation in their childhood.
9 Variable PROCR is the response data to this question averaged over time, where a larger value implies a stronger tendency for procrastination or hyperbolic discounting. The JHPS survey also asked respondents in 2007 and 2008 how they had projected doing homework assignments for the vacation in their childhood with the same point scales as above. We define differences in PROCR from the response to this question and average them over time as NAÏVE, which indicates the degree of default in own planning. It is hypothesized that, with other things being equal, the respondents' cigarette consumption depends positively on PROCR and NAÏVE. Table 5 shows that PROCR and NAÏVE have strongly positive correlation with smoking as predicted. Figure 2 shows the distributions of PROCR and NAÏVE. As shown in panel A, the proportion of people who had done their homework assignment latterly, whose PROCR is more than 4, is slightly less than half of the respondents. Meanwhile 67.1% of all respondents, shown in panel B, had been unable to do their homework assignment when planned.
Insert Figure 2:
Distributions of PROCR and NAÏVE
Control variables
We define the following variables for controlling personal attributes: RISKAV, MALE, UNIV, INCOME, AGE, and CHILD.
RISKAV measures the degree of risk aversion, which is constructed by subtracting from 100 the respondents' responses to the question: "When you go out, how high a probability of rainfall makes you bring an umbrella with you?" We hypothesize that more risk-averse respondents are likely to consume less cigarettes.
MALE is a binary indicator which equals 1 if the respondent is male and 0 if female. As shown in Table 2 and Figure1, average cigarette consumption and smoking rates for males are larger than for females in our Japanese data, and therefore we naturally hypothesize that being male has positive effects on smoking.
UNIV is a proxy variable of respondents' education level, which equals 1 if the respondent had received college education and 0 otherwise. It was hypothesized that persons with a college background smoke less than others.
INCOME takes the value of per capita household income in ten thousand yen. Previous studies empirically verify positive relation between income levels and the smoking status (e.g., Hersch, 2000; Ishii, 2005) . 10 According to the literature, we hypothesize that persons earning higher incomes are likely to consume less cigarettes.
AGE takes ages of respondents. Hersch (2000) shows that the effect of age on cigarette consumption displays a nonlinear relation, which is significantly positive for the linear term and negative for the quadratic term. Ishii (2005) reports the same relation for japanese female samples. We hypothesize that the effect of AGE on cigarette consumption is positive in the linear term and negative in the quadratic term.
CHILD is a binary indicator that takes 1 if the respondent has children and 0 otherwise. Hersch (2000) reports that females having a youngest child under 2 years old decrease their cigarette consumption. Our hypothesis is that females with children moderate their smoking behavior.
The correlation coefficients between control variables and SMOKING are shown in table 7.
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Insert Table 7 :
Correlations between SMOKING and control variables MALE displays a significantly positive coefficient and RISKAV and UNIV display negative coefficients for all, male, and female samples as expected. The coefficient of INCOME for female samples is significantly negative as hypothesized. On the other hand, for all and male samples, the coefficients of INCOME are insignificant, which is consistent with Ishii (2005) .
Coefficients of AGE are negative and strongly significant. These results are seemingly shown as 10 Hersch (2000) reports that high-income groups display lower smoking rates than other groups by using US data. Ishii (2005) shows that, by using Japanese data, logarithmic household income displays a significantly negative correlation with the amount of cigarette consumption for female samples and with smoking rates for male and female samples. contrary evidence for the literature and our hypothesis. As seen in Figure 3 , however, which displays graph trends of averaged cigarette consumption of smokers by gender in their 20s to 70s, cigarette consumption looks like following quadratic trends. In the next section, we will use the linear and the quadratic terms of AGE as explanatory variables for capturing the age trend of smoking.
Insert Figure 3:
Age trends of averaged cigarette consumption of smokers
As is pointed out in Hersch (2000), for female samples, CHILD displays a significantly negative coefficient, which implies that the presence of children reduces cigarette consumption. 
Determinants of smoking behavior
In this section, we estimate the marginal effects on SMOKING using random-effects tobit models to identify determinants of cigarette consumption. The following three models are estimated: model (1) uses as explanatory variables DISCRATE, HYPERBOL, SIGN, and other control variables including TAX; model (2) adopts PROCR, instead of HYPERBOL, to capture the effect of hyperbolic discounting; and model (3) adopts NAÏVE for hyperbolic discounting. All the models are estimated in all, male and female samples. Table 8 shows the estimation results. All coefficients display the marginal effects which are measured around the mean values of smokers.
Insert Table8:
Random-effects tobit estimations for SMOKING 12 Unreported tests of the differences of the average of cigarette consumption between females with and without children including nonsmokers' samples suggest that the former significantly smoke less than the latter, but using only smokers' samples suggest that having children is insignificant. This implies that having children leads to quitting, rather than reducing, smoking.
Tax hikes
The coefficients of TAX are significantly negative for all and male samples, where hiking per cigarette tax by one yen, ceteris paribus, decreases per capita cigarette consumption by 0.32 (model (3)) to 0.43 (model (2)) in all samples or by 0.49 (model (3)) to 0.60 (model (2)) in male samples. On the other hand, the insignificant coefficients for the female sample suggest that there would be some female-specific factors that push up their smoking in our sample period. Differences in smoking moderation behavior under tax hikes due to the types of time discounting and/or the degree of the biases will be estimated in the next section.
Time discounting
In model (1), consistent with our hypothesis, DISCRATE displays positive effects on cigarette consumption, which are, significant for all and female samples. The sign effect SIGN has expected negative coefficients, which are significant for all and male samples. In contrast, the results regarding the coefficients of HYPERBOL are weak. In particular, they are insignificantly negative for all and male samples.
In model (2) and model (3), all of DISCRATE, PROCR and NAÏVE display fairly significant coefficients with the expected sign. Especially, all of them have strongly significant coefficients in the all sample case. Male samples also display significant effects of these variables, and for female samples all coefficients of time discounting variables except for the sign effect of model (2) are significant. All of them are consistent with our expectations.
In sum, cigarette consumption has expected correlations with discount rates, procrastination, naiveness, and the sign effect. Discount rates, for example, that exceed the average by one unit of standard deviation, ceteris paribus, increase the amount of cigarette consumption by 0.32 (model (2) 
Control variables
Estimated coefficients of risk aversion variables (RISKAV) display expectedly negative signs , which are strongly significant for all and female samples in all the models. For example, cigarette consumption for female respondents who are risk averse such that their critical precipitation percentage to bring an umbrella is 10% higher than the average is ceteris paribus lower than the average female by 0.13 (model (3)) to 0.14 (model (1) and (2)). The coefficients of MALE display significantly positive implying that male respondents smoke more heavily than female ones by 5.21 (model (3) 
The effects of tax hikes
In this section, we analyze the effects of time discounting biases on the reduction of cigarette consumption responding to the hiking of cigarette tax. To do so, we sort the sample from the viewpoints of hyperbolic discounting, the procrastinating tendency, and naïveness, and thereby compare the estimated coefficients of TAX among the sorted samples. Our hypothesis is that cigarette consumption of hyperbolic discounting, procrastination, or naïve agents respond more negatively to tax hikes than other samples.
Responses to tax hikes with/without hyperbolic discounting
To detect the effect of hyperbolic discounting, respondents are classified by using HYPERBOL and PROC as follows: Table 9 shows the marginal effects of tax hikes on cigarette consumption for each type of agents by using random-effects tobit models. All models use SMOKING for dependent variables, and are estimated in all, male and female samples by controlling for DISCRATE, SIGN, RISKAV, MALE, UNIV, AGE, AGE^2, INCOME, INCOME^2, and CHILD. The coefficients indicate the marginal effects of TAX.
Panel A of table 9 displays the estimated coefficients of TAX whose samples are sorted by using HYPERBOL. For all and male samples, the coefficients of hyperbolic agents (HYPERBOL=1) are significantly negative and the coefficients of exponential agents (HYPERBOL=0) are insignificant. The differences of the responses to tax hikes between hyperbolic and exponential agents are -0.186 in all samples and -0.442 in the male samples, which are both negative as expected. These results imply that hyperbolic agents reduced cigarette consumption after the tax hike more than exponential discounting agents. For the female samples, the estimated coefficients are insignificant in both agents, however.
Panel B compares the effect of tax reduction on cigarette consumption among different degrees of procrastinating tendency. In the all sample case, the coefficients are significantly negative for respondents with strong and modest procrastination while the coefficient is insignificantly negative for respondents with weak/ no procrastination. The difference of the coefficients between the respondents with strong procrastination and those with weak/ no procrastination is positive as expected. For males, the coefficients for respondents with strong procrastination and with weak/no procrastination are significantly negative, where the difference between the coefficients is negative, consistent with our expectations. For the female sample, although all the coefficients are insignificant, they have expected signs. In sum, hyperbolic or procrastinative agents reduce their cigarette consumption more than exponential agents after tax hikes, which implies that these agents postpone smoking moderation up to after-tax-hike period even though the tax hike was preannounced several months before..
Insert Table 9:
Comparing the marginal effects of tax hikes for each agent HYPERBOL and PROCR
Naïve vs. Sophisticated
We also detect the effect of naiveness by defining the degree of naiveness as follows:
(iii) The degree of naiveness: Respondents are classified as:
naïve if 1 NAÏVE < 4; and strongly naïve if NAÏVE = 4.
By sorting the sample by the degree of naiveness, Table 10 compares the marginal effects of tax hikes on the cigarette consumption, which are estimated in the same manner as table 9. The values of the estimated coefficients and their differences are consistent with our expectations. In particular, the coefficients for strongly naïve agents in all and female samples and those for naïve agents in all and male samples are significant, where all of the differences exhibit negative signs as expected. These results imply that naïve agents postpone smoking moderation even when a tax hike is pre-announced. It is only after the actual tax hike when they reduce cigarette consumption.
Insert Table 10 :
Comparing the marginal effects of tax hikes for each agent NAÏVE
Policy implications
Cigarettes are addictive goods which have two important aspects related to policyl decisions: firstly, habitual consumption of them damages health status, and consequently brings about decreases of social welfare and increases of the medical care costs; and secondly the revenues from cigarette taxes are a significant source of public finance. For the governments to decide the cigarette tax level by taking into account both national health care and tax revenues, it is important to estimate the quantitative effects of cigarette tax hikes on smoking behavior and on the resulting tax revenues. (around USD 0.55). This implies that even though the government sets the per-pack price of cigarettes at JPY 1,477.09 (around USD 13.78), there is a room to raise tax revenues on one hand, and to decrease the domestic smoking rate, on the other hand.
14 Insert Table 11: Tax hikes, smoking moderation, and tax revenue model (3).
14 On March 24th, the Japanese government has passed a bill on hiking the cigarette tax by JPY 3.5 (around USD 0.03) per cigarette in October 1st, 2010. Following the passage, JT (Japan Tobacco, Inc.), the Japan's monopolistic cigarette manufacturer, has announced the decision to increase cigarette prices to around JPY 410 to 440 (around USD 3.83 to 4.11) per 20-cigarette pack. According to our estimation results, it is predicted that, by executing the tax-and price-increasing policy, smokers would decrease by 10.7%, and that government's revenue would increase by about 20.3 to 28.4%.
Insert Figure 4:
Tax hikes and the increasing rates of tax revenue
Conclusion
By using our broad panel survey of Japanese adults, we have found that discount rates and its behavioral biases affect smoking behavior. Respondents' discount rates are higher, or their procrastinating tendency or naiveness is stronger, they are likely to smoke more than others. In the response to cigarette tax hikes, hyperbolic, procrastinating or naïve agents postpone smoking moderation up to after-tax-hike period even though the tax hike was preannounced several months before.
We have also clarified that the Japanese government is able to hike cigarette taxes for increasing tax revenue. The government's tax-rising policy, however, does not necessary lead to consumer's welfare improvement. It causes welfare losses to exponential discounters, whereas it works as a commitment devise for hyperbolic discounters and consequently increases their welfare level. As the further research, we would like to incorporate heterogeneity of discounting function to determine precise welfare-changing processes and the quantities induced by tax-changing policies. Note: "Hypothesis" shows the theoritically predicted signs of associations with smoking. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively . 
